In August 2015, the decades-long conflict between South Korea and North Korea appeared to be nearing a breaking point.
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have deep historical roots dating back to the Korean War (1950–1953), which ended in an armistice rather than a peace treaty. But this particular flare-up began when South Korea accused the North of planting landmines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), severely injuring two South Korean border guards.
South Korea responded with a familiar—and provocative—tactic: blasting anti–North Korean propaganda broadcasts across the border through loudspeakers.
North Korea labeled the broadcasts an “act of war” and threatened “strong military action,” including strikes against the loudspeakers, if the broadcasts did not stop. Within days, artillery fire was exchanged. Military forces on both sides were placed on high alert.
The crisis quickly escalated into a high-stakes confrontation requiring serious conflict management.
Claim your FREE copy: The New Conflict Management
In our FREE special report from the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School - The New Conflict Management: Effective Conflict Resolution Strategies to Avoid Litigation – renowned negotiation experts uncover unconventional approaches to conflict management that can turn adversaries into partners.
Emergency Talks Under Escalation Pressure
Amid rising tensions, the two governments agreed to emergency negotiations.
Senior officials met at the border:
- South Korea’s chief national security adviser
- A leading North Korean military officer
Their talks lasted three days. North Korean representatives reportedly took repeated breaks to consult with Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un before making decisions.
At the core of the impasse was a familiar negotiation dilemma: apology versus face-saving language.
South Korean President Park Geun-hye stated that the loudspeaker broadcasts would continue until North Korea issued an apology for the landmine incident.
North Korea refused.
Deadlock loomed.
The Breakthrough: Regret Without Responsibility
The compromise that emerged illustrates a classic principle of conflict resolution: carefully crafted language can unlock agreement.
North Korea agreed to express “regrets” over the injuries—but did not formally accept responsibility.
This distinction mattered.
By accepting an expression of regret rather than a full apology, South Korea allowed North Korea to save face. In return, North Korea agreed to:
- Resume reunions for families separated by the Korean War
- Commit publicly to further dialogue aimed at improving relations
South Korea shut off the loudspeakers—while reserving the right to resume broadcasts if “abnormal” developments occurred.
The immediate crisis de-escalated.
Face-Saving as a Conflict Management Tool
This episode highlights several important principles of international negotiation and conflict management:
- Public Toughness Can Escalate Quickly
Statements designed to project strength—such as calling an action an “act of war”—can trigger escalatory spirals that become difficult to control.
Leaders often face domestic political pressures to appear resolute. But rhetoric can narrow diplomatic flexibility.
- Language Matters
The difference between “apology” and “regret” may appear semantic—but in diplomacy, wording can be decisive.
Crafting statements that allow both sides to claim legitimacy at home is often central to de-escalation.
Face-saving provisions are not weakness. They are frequently essential components of sustainable agreements.
- Provocation May Be Strategic
Some analysts speculated that North Korea may have exaggerated the loudspeakers’ impact to draw South Korea into talks.
In negotiation and conflict management, provocations may serve as signals—attempts to shift the interaction from military to diplomatic channels.
Recognizing that adversarial moves may contain an invitation to negotiate can change how leaders respond.
Domestic Politics and International Negotiation
Both leaders faced internal audiences.
For Kim Jong-un, still early in his leadership at the time, the crisis offered an opportunity to demonstrate authority and control.
For President Park, the compromise may have helped temper criticism that her hard-line rhetoric contributed to escalation.
International negotiation rarely unfolds in a vacuum. Domestic political considerations shape bargaining behavior and public statements.
Conflict Management Lessons for Negotiators
Although this crisis unfolded on the international stage, the lessons apply more broadly:
- Escalatory rhetoric can reduce flexibility.
- Carefully crafted language can unlock impasse.
- Face-saving mechanisms are often essential.
- Not every provocation requires symmetrical escalation.
- Dialogue under pressure can still produce creative solutions.
In negotiation and conflict management, symbolic concessions can sometimes generate substantive gains.
Beyond the 2015 Crisis
While tensions between North and South Korea have fluctuated since 2015, the episode remains a useful illustration of how brinkmanship can be followed by pragmatic compromise.
Even in highly adversarial environments, negotiators can:
- Reframe demands
- Adjust language
- Preserve dignity
- De-escalate conflict
The path from artillery fire to family reunions was not inevitable. It required deliberate diplomatic choices.
What Do You Think?
What stands out to you about this example of conflict management?
Was the compromise a prudent face-saving maneuver—or a risky concession?
Share your thoughts below.
Claim your FREE copy: The New Conflict Management
In our FREE special report from the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School - The New Conflict Management: Effective Conflict Resolution Strategies to Avoid Litigation – renowned negotiation experts uncover unconventional approaches to conflict management that can turn adversaries into partners.
As a person living in South Korea, I was enormously relieved that the August standoff did not escalate further than it did. But to call the KPA’s placement of landmines in the DMZ an action
“intended to inspire steps in conflict resolution” is both highly improbable and disturbingly blasé about the deliberate maiming of two ROK soldiers. If this article is suggesting that the KPA or even Kim Jong Un intended to somehow bring about resolution of the 62-year-old conflict by killing (or trying to kill) ROK soldiers, it’s hard to imagine a more monstrous miscalculation. The act itself precipitated a crisis, which then necessitated a dialogue in the hope of gaining concessions. This is a standard DPRK practice historically, not a creative negotiation gambit. And for what it’s worth, the Military Demarcation Line is not a border.