Scenario:
Camp Lemonnier is a United States Naval Expeditionary Base located in the African country of Djibouti. Djibouti, bordering Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, has been home to Camp Lemonnier since the September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to seek a temporary staging ground for U.S. Marines in the region. Since then, Camp Lemonnier has expanded to nearly 500 acres and a base of unparalleled importance, in part because it is one of the busiest Predator drone bases outside of the Afghan warzone. Camp Lemonnier is home to the Combined Joint Task Force―Horn of Africa of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)—and is the only permanent U.S. military base in Africa.
Tensions between the two usually friendly nations took a turn after the crash of a U.S. Predator drone in the capital city of Djibouti. The United States Defense Attaché and the Djiboutian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs are meeting to renegotiate the terms of the lease contract for Camp Lemonnier. The negotiation will include the following issues: contract length, total lease payments per year, potential for renegotiation, economic development aid, and support for the local population, including staffing at the base.
Major lessons of this simulation include:
- Defining BATNA: knowing your own BATNA will help you not accept a deal that is suboptimal to your likely walk-away alternative.
- Understanding the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA): By estimating the ZOPA prior to a negotiation you can avoid taking a deal that is worse for you than your next best (realistic) alternative.
- The impact of culture in negotiation.
- Process management and agenda setting.
- Uncovering interests: integrative bargaining, or “mutual gain” negotiation, focuses on the idea that through careful preparation a negotiation outcome can be favorable for both sides.
- Principal-agent dynamics.
- Uncovering sources of power in negotiation.
This exercise is based on the real 2014 negotiations between the United States of America and the Republic of Djibouti. The Camp Lemonnier Case Study, which details the real-life negotiation, is available for purchase separately, and can be used either with this simulation or on its own.
Materials:
- General Instructions for all parties
- Confidential Instructions for Djiboutian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Confidential Instructions for United States Defense Attaché
- Results Form
- Teaching Notes
Camp Lemonnier Case Study
Scenario:
In the spring of 2014, representatives from the United States of America and the Republic of Djibouti were in the midst of renegotiations over Camp Lemonnier, the only permanent U.S. base on the continent of Africa. Djibouti, bordering Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, has been home to Camp Lemonnier since the September 11, 2001 attacks prompted the United States to seek a temporary staging ground for U.S. Marines in the region. Since then, Camp Lemonnier has expanded to nearly 500 acres and a base of unparalleled importance, in part because it is one of the busiest Predator drone bases outside of the Afghan warzone.
The U.S. is not alone in recognizing the strategic importance of Djibouti. France and Japan have well-established military presences and launch operations from the Djibouti-Ambouli International airport, as well. As of spring 2014, Russia was also reportedly vying for a similar land lease in the country.
Tensions between the United States and Djibouti have flared in recent years, due in large part to a string of collisions and close calls because of Djiboutian air-traffic controllers’ job performance at the airport. Americans have complained about the training of air-traffic controllers at the commercial airport. Additionally, labor disputes have arisen at the base where the United States is one of the largest non-government employers within the country.
Major lessons of this case study include:
- Defining BATNA: what is each party’s BATNA?
- Understanding the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA): what is the ZOPA in this case?
- The impact of culture in negotiation.
- Uncovering interests.
- Principal-agent dynamics.
- Uncovering sources of power in negotiation.
This case can be paired with the Camp Lemonnier Simulation, available for purchase separately from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC). The simulation is a two-party, multi-issue, fictionalized version of these negotiations.
Materials:
- Case Study Part A
- Case Study Part B
- Teaching Notes
Canada-China Panda Acquisition Negotiation
SCENARIO:
In 2010, after years of communication with the Chinese Association of Zoological Gardens (CAZG) concerning a loan of giant pandas, Toronto Zoo officials see a “ripe moment” to intensify their efforts and undertake formal negotiations. They designate a Chinese-Canadian spokesman and discuss partnering with Calgary Zoo. The Canadians face serious challenges, however. Giant pandas are an endangered species native only to one country: China. Moreover as “star attractions,” they are in demand by zoos all over the world. Political and economic factors within and between the two countries complicate the situation.
MECHANICS:
The two teams will meet separately for an hour to discuss their objectives and strategies. The Canadian teams face the challenge of developing an internal alignment. Then the two teams will meet and negotiate for one hour. All negotiators stand to benefit from agreement but each has limits on how far he or she can accommodate the others.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
For all parties:
- No separate general or “public” information (it is incorporated in confidential instructions)
Role Specific:
Confidential Instructions for:
- John Smith, CEO of Toronto Zoo
- Dr. Ming-Tat Li, Chair of Giant Panda Acquisition Task Force, TorontoZoo Board of Management
- Dr. Clement Dupont, President and CEO of Calgary Zoo
- WANG Zhongping (family name appears first), Vice-President and Secretary General of the Chinese Association of Zoological Gardens (CAZG)
- MA Zhong, Deputy Secretary General of CAZG
Teacher’s Package:
- All of the above (51 pages)
MAJOR LESSONS:
- To achieve a satisfactory agreement from a low-power position, a negotiator must focus on parties’ interests and resources, and generate creative (non-standard) proposals.
- Identify and resolve internal differences before commencing external negotiations so that the negotiation team can act cohesively. Internal cooperation is especially important when the team experiences pressure in external negotiations.
- Call a caucus as needed during external negotiations in order to manage the team and/or the negotiation process.
- Among the different negotiation roles that team members may assume, an intermediary (process orchestrator) must have a special set of attributes and skills. Some of these may be innate or assigned; others must be earned on the scene.
- To make progress in complex negotiations (many issues of various types), negotiators must clearly and explicitly set forth an agenda of items for discussion. How, and when, they are discussed should be deliberate and strategic.
- Negotiators should move back and forth between discussions of the “big picture” and the hammering out of details. Too much of one or the other bogs down proceedings and leads to suboptimal outcomes.
- When parties’ positions on one issue indicate no zone of possible agreement, additional issues and package deals should be considered.
- Negotiators must strategically choose to reveal or withhold information. Too much or too little information, at the wrong time, can drastically affect the attainment of their individual goals.
PROCESS THEMES:
Bargaining power, coordination of internal and external negotiations, agenda-setting, intermediaries (tactics, effects), information management, interests, aspirations, value creation
SCENARIO:
Approximately three years ago, Cape Development Corporation sold one of its thirteen adjoining lots to Charlie Davis. Although Davis had plans for the lot, it is still undeveloped. The City Council has now passed a cluster zoning ordinance which permits townhouse development if some land is permanently dedicated as open space. The 12 remaining lots, which are still owned by CDC, together with Davis' lot, make a prime location for a cluster development. Such a financial asset is appealing to both parties, and has led them to this meeting to pursue a development. Both Davis and CDC have empowered agents to represent them, giving them authority up to maximum offers.
MECHANICS:
This one-on-one negotiation can run from 30-60 minutes. Teams of two can also be used, with somewhat longer times for preparation and negotiation.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
Role Specific:
Confidential Instructions for:
- Cape Development Corp. Representative
- Charlie Davis' Representative
Teacher's Package:
PROCESS THEMES:
Attorney/Client relations; Authority; Competition v. Cooperation; Cost-benefit analysis; Financial analysis; Information exchange; Joint gains; Lawyering; Objective criteria; Offers, first; Options, generating; Pareto optimization; Quantitative analysis; Relationship; Reservation price; Risk aversion
MAJOR LESSONS:
There is tremendous opportunity for exploring creative options in this negotiation. Poorly handled, however, an adversarial deadlock can result. What techniques minimize the likelihood of that outcome?
The distributive bargaining component of the negotiation permits participants to perform cost-benefit analysis, as well as reflect on the importance of focusing on joint gains.
It is useful to explore how the participants use their reservation prices to determine opening positions and concession strategies. Is this justified? Effective?
Participants can see what role analysis of projected costs plays in achieving a Pareto-optimal outcome, and what effect it has on the decision-making process.
Carter Estate Problem, The
SCENARIO:
James Carter, husband of Rosie Carter and father of Chris and Terry Carter, recently died after a four year battle with an undisclosed illness. Having plenty of warning, Mr. Carter (also head of the successful family cosmetic business) carefully planned for the disposition of his assets upon his death. The majority of issues surrounding the settlement of his estate have been resolved, however, a few minor issues remain unresolved and have led to dispute between his two children. The first dispute concerns Mr. Carter’s lakeside retreat. Secondarily, there are concerns over the distribution of some of Mr. Carter’s personal effects. The personal effects include: a stamp collection, a diamond ring, a pocket watch, a membership in the Metropolitan Club and the award-winning, family dog, Bonzo.
MAJOR LESSONS:
- This exercise presents the opportunity to use a careful analysis of the interests of the parties to craft an agreement to solve a dispute.
- This exercise illustrates the danger of single-issue bargaining. Should participants limit the negotiation to a monetary dispute, Chris and Terry will be locked in a contest of wills. Hard bargaining may well emerge, resulting in a situation in which one party’s gain means a corresponding loss to the other party.
- Good negotiators put the distributive issues in this case in perspective and reduce their importance by dovetailing interests with creative options that expand the pie. This case has an enormous potential range of such creative options.
MECHANICS:
This exercise is best one-on-one. Allow approximately 30 minutes for preparation and 30-45 minutes for negotiation. Debriefing should last at least 30 minutes.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
- For all parties:
- Role specific:Confidential Instructions for:
- Chris Carter
- Terry Carter
- Teacher’s Package:
PROCESS THEMES:
BATNA; Communication; Competition v. Cooperation; Emotions; Fairness; Interest, dovetailing; Joint gains; Legitimacy; Options, generating
Choosing the Dispute Resolution Forum
This discussion piece presents twelve case studies for review. The case studies involve a range of factual and legal scenarios, including personal injury, discrimination, breach of contract, employment termination, hazardous waste, business leasing, fraud, divorce, date rape, partnership, dissolution, and juvenile delinquency. After reading each case study, students decide and discuss which form of dispute resolution (case evaluation, mediation, arbitration, mini-trial, summary jury trial, or trial) would be most appropriate. Some of the case studies include follow-up questions for further discussion.
Christiana Figueres and the Collaborative Approach to Negotiating Climate Action
The Program on Negotiation (PON) at Harvard Law School periodically presents the Great Negotiator Award to an individual whose lifetime achievements in the field of negotiation and dispute resolution have had a significant and lasting impact. In 2022, PON selected Christiana Figueres as the recipient of its Great Negotiator Award.
As UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Christiana Figueres was tasked with a seemingly insurmountable challenge of putting together an impactful, global climate agreement to save the planet. Coming out the dramatic failure of the Copenhagen summit, many believed that such an agreement was not possible. However, with persistent optimism and careful, targeted interventions aimed at building momentum, in 2015 the Paris Agreement was unanimously adopted by the 196 participating nations and set forth a new framework for international climate agreements.
Figueres had to personally undergo a transformation to let go of her identity as a Costa Rican diplomat so she could approach the negotiations from a global perspective and meet each participating nation from their perspective. The negotiation process itself was not just the two-week conference in Paris but instead was a years-long series of actions taken by Figueres and others to help enhance the probability of a successful outcome at the negotiating table. These actions included things like discussions with private industry groups, repeated talks with the Saudi government, and Operation Groundswell, in which a small team of strategic influencers worked with partners behind the scenes to build support for an ambitious outcome. By bringing different coalitions of countries and non-state actors together to lead the way, a more expansive agreement became possible.
Major lessons of this case study include:
- Coalition and spoiler management in complex international treaty negotiations
- Principal-agent dynamics
- Active listening and difficult conversations
- Building momentum for an agreement
- Power dynamics in negotiation
- Deal implementation and sustainability
This case can be paired with the Great Negotiator 2022: Christiana Figueres videos, available for purchase separately from the Teaching Negotiation Resource Center (TNRC).
Collective Bargaining at Central Division
SCENARIO:
The union and management bargaining teams for American Phone Company are preparing for upcoming negotiations. The last round of negotiations in 1986 was disastrous; there was a strike and relationships were damaged. The leadership on both sides would like things to go better this time around and has said that they want to work toward a more cooperative relationship. Trust between the two groups has eroded over the years, however, any attempts to employ a mutual gains approach here is not necessarily met with enthusiasm by their constituencies. The negotiations revolve around three issues likely to be on the table in 1989: wages, employment security and medical benefits.
MECHANICS:
Individuals should be given at least 30 minutes to read general and confidential material. Internal group negotiations and preparations should take 60-90 minutes. External negotiations between management and the union can take 60-90 minutes.
MAJOR LESSONS:
- There are often legitimate differences within bargaining teams. These internal conflicts ought to be worked out before serious bargaining begins as unresolved internal conflict can create problems when it comes time to ratify carefully crafted draft agreements. This exercise creates the opportunity for participants to practice techniques and strategies of managing internal team conflict.
- In most collective bargaining situations, each side begins by staking out its position. Both usually do this before they even hear what the concerns are of the other side. This often leads to the process of trading concessions which results in minimally acceptable outcomes. To achieve maximum joint gains it is necessary to focus instead on listening to the interests of the other side before staking out opening positions. The best techniques for probing interests can be studied.
- Using statements developed during the session on probing interests, the best ways of inventing options for mutual gain and the power of creative options can be explored.
- The significance of relationships can be studied in the context of negotiation strategies. The impact of existing and future relationships on implementation can be explored.
- Issues of representation can be examined, since each of the players represents a group or institutional constituency. Each representative has a mandate which aids or constrains his or her ability to negotiate.
- This game allows the players to explore the influence of threats and promises on the behavior of other parties.
- The game raises questions of relationship, precedent and reputation. All sides have important long-term interests.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
For all parties:
- Inventing Options for Mutual Gain — Instructions
For Union Members (L. Rigley, A. Jones, and M. Bemis):
For Management Members (K. Lewis, R. Gentry, and J. Evans):
Confidential Instructions for Internal Team Negotiations:
- M. Bemis, President of the Local
- A. Jones, Staff Member of the International Union
- L. Rigley, Regional Representative of the International Union
Management Representatives:
- J. Evans, Manager of Large Business Services
- R. Gentry, Head of the Benefits Department
- K. Lewis, Division Manager of Labor Relations
Confidential Instructions for Identifying Interests:
Union Representatives:
- M. Bemis, President of the Local
- A. Jones, Staff Member of the International Union
- L. Rigley, Regional Representative of the International Union
Management Representatives:
- J. Evans, Manager of Large Business Services
- R. Gentry, Head of the Benefits Department
- K. Lewis, Division Manager of Labor Relations
Teacher's Package:
PROCESS THEMES:
Agenda control; Caucusing; Competition v. Cooperation; Consensus building; Interest, dovetailing; Issue control; Joint gains; Options, generating; Packaging; Recurring negotiations
SCENARIO:
J.B. Daniels is the Vice President of Health, Safety and Environmental Affairs at Colortek, a large manufacturer of film and photographic equipment located in the Northwest. In the four years that J.B. Daniels has been with Colortek, he/she has done much to increase the environmental awareness at the company. Recently, Daniels' second-in-command got the ball rolling on a "Green Marketing" campaign but has since left Colortek. Daniels has a strong interest in filling this position as soon as possible so that his/her department does not lose control of the "Green Marketing" project. Chris Dawson, a former Assistant Press Secretary to the Governor, has interviewed with J.B. Daniels twice thus far and has easily been the strongest candidate for the job. Dawson, however, is due to start business school in eight months. Daniels and Dawson are about to meet for the third time to discuss the final details of the position and money. There is a lot of overlap in terms of salary.
MECHANICS:
This is a one-on-one exercise. Participants should be given 15-30 to prepare and 30 minutes to negotiate. Debriefing should take at least 30 minutes, 60-90 minutes is sufficient.
MAJOR LESSONS:
- The knowledge that one's BATNA is weak often leads people to negotiate much less vigorously than they otherwise would. Is this ever justified? If so, under what conditions? The case affords a good opportunity to point out that any such analyses should be based on a consideration of the parties' relative BATNA's.
- The available data allow a number of more or less equally persuasive arguments about what a "fair" salary would be. This is at a minimum good practice in developing and using objective criteria. Beyond that, the exercise presents the more difficult challenge of finding an objective basis with which to judge the applicability of alternative objective criteria.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
For all parties:
Role Specific:
Confidential Instructions for:
Teacher's Package:
PROCESS THEMES:
Anchoring; BATNA; Communication; Creativity; Fairness; Information exchange; Joint gains; Offers, first; Options, generating; Relationship
SCENARIO:
S. Smith, of the town Riverton, has been assigned the task of overseeing the reprogramming of the town's computerized municipal operations and the training of those employees. Smith, after careful review, has selected J. Brown of Northeast Computer Services for the sizable job. The problem, however, is that Brown has offered to do the job for $20,000, somewhat below the corporate rate, and Smith, due to a restricted budget, is constrained to spending no more than $10,000. The two have agreed to one last meeting in hopes of reaching an acceptable solution.
Teaching Materials:
For all parties:
General Information
Teacher's Package:
All of the Above
Teaching Note (from the Tendley Contract)
PROCESS THEMES: Anchoring; BATNA; Constituents; Constraints; Fairness; Interests, dovetailing; Objective criteria; Offers, first; Options, generating; Pareto optimization; Precedents; Risk perception
MAJOR LESSONS:
The available data allow a number of more or less equally persuasive arguments about what a "fair" contract would be. This is at a minimum good practice in developing and using objective criteria. Beyond that, the case presents the more difficult challenge of finding an objective basis with which to judge the applicability of alternative objective criteria.
Contract Negotiations in the Building Trades
SCENARIO:
Three coalitions representing building contractors, building trade unions, and users of contract services are about to begin contract negotiations. Prior to the full negotiation session, each coalition will meet to discuss internal differences. Each of the three coalitions has three members representing a different internal group. They will focus on wage increases, health benefits, and double-breasting (contractors using non-union workers through subsidiary contractors). These have been outlined in the Proposed Framework for the New Building Trades Contract distributed by the staff of the Builders Association (a member of the building contractor's coalition). In addition, a number of other issues will need to be worked out. These derive mostly from prior relationships and skewed perceptions. A threat of a strike exists, which would disadvantage all three groups. Their objective is to reach an agreement that all parties can accept.
MAJOR LESSONS:
- The differences in the way the players value issues open the door for trading. The parties will have to decide what they are willing to trade and what their BATNA's are. This game provides the opportunity not only for trading across issues, but also within issues.
- The two-tier negotiation suggests a double meaning of "success." Parties must make both substantive and procedural decisions. If the coalitions do not embark upon the main negotiation with a united front; the meaning of "success" could easily become very individualistic.
- The process of creating and claiming value in this game is quite explicit. Although there are only three main issues, the parties may add more or less importance to each by "reading in" certain assumptions about past or future relations.
- This is a good exercise for people in actual contract negotiations, especially those facing multi-trade bargaining problems.
- The important role that external parties can play is illustrated by the use of the media in this case. Parties must strategically manage external relationships in order to have the desired effect on the negotiation.
- This game allows the players to explore the influence of threats and promises on the behavior of other parties. These must be handled carefully to have the intended effect.
MECHANICS:
This game works best with nine players (one per role). A game manager is needed to answer questions and collect written versions of each coalition's negotiation objectives following preliminary one-hour (at minimum) meetings. The ensuing negotiations should run about two hours. More time is preferable. Debriefings take approximately one and one-half hours.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
For all parties:
- Proposed Framework for the New Building Trades Contract
Role-Specific:
Confidential Advice to the:
- Metropolitan Power Corporation
- Regional Hospital Association
Teacher's Package:
KEYWORDS/THEMES:
Agenda control; Anchoring; Apologies; Assumptions; BATNA; Bi-level negotiations; Bluffing; Caucusing; Collaborative problem-solving; Communication; Competition v. Cooperation; Consensus building; Cost-benefit analysis; Constituents; Currently perceived choice analysis; Drafting; Emotions; Ethics; Fairness; Group process; Interest analysis; Interests, quantifying; Joint game; Labor Issues; Labor Relations; Legitimacy; Meaning of "success"; Negotiating entry; Meeting design; Misrepresentation; Objective criteria; Offers, first; Packaging; Partisan perceptions; Precedents; Preparation; Pressure tactics; Public opinion; Recurring negotiations; Reservation price; Risk aversion; Risk perception; Separating the people from the problem; Threats; Time constraints; Trading, issues; Trust
SIMILAR SIMULATIONS:
Collective Bargaining at Central Division
SCENARIO:
Alex Appros was a well-qualified and efficient employee of Costless, a consumer outlet chain, who quickly advanced within the company hierarchy. After three years at Costless, Appros was fired under allegations of embezzlement. Appros claims that this firing was based solely on his supervisor’s racial prejudice, and he is now suing the company for discrimination. Both sides wish to avoid trial and the possible accompanying publicity, so they have each hired a negotiator to settle the dispute. Each side possesses undisclosed information which may bear on the outcome of the settlement, and it is up to the clients to determine how much of this information to divulge to their respective negotiators.
MECHANICS:
The case is designed for four to five people: one person who will play Appros, one who will play the Vice President of Costless, and one negotiator on each side. There is also an optional role for Costless’ accountant, who is familiar with the undisclosed information of each side. Preparation should take about 60 minutes for each participant, client interviews should last 30-40 minutes and the actual negotiation should take between 60-90 minutes.
MAJOR LESSONS:
- How does internal conflict over these issues manifest itself in verbal and nonverbal behavior? What differential effects do different negotiation techniques have on the level of conflict — can partisan perceptions be strengthened by some approaches, greater understanding promoted by others? Which is desirable on an individual or societal level?
- This case provides an excellent opportunity to plan, practice, and test skills in “separating the people from the problem,” and dealing with each on their own merits.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
Role Specific:
Confidential Instructions for:
- Negotiator for Alex Appros
- Negotiator for Chris Clarion and Vice President of Costless
- (Optional) William Walters, Accountant for Costless
- Questionnaire for Alex Appros
- Questionnaire for Chris Clarion
Teacher’s Package (25 pages total):
PROCESS THEMES:
Negotiator-Client relationship; Disclosure; Illegal conduct; BATNA; Interests; Options, generating; Preparation
A video-recorded debriefing of the PON role simulation "DEC v. Riverside" by simulation co-author David Lax, including an analysis of players' scores. Dr. Lax is a former professor at Harvard Business School and a managing principal of the negotiation consulting firm Lax Sebenius, LLC.
This video is intended as a demonstration for instructors preparing to debrief "DEC v. Riverside" or comparable simulations, not as a classroom presentation tool.
Production Quality: Utility
SCENARIO:
Riverside Lumber is a pulp manufacturer in a small town in the Pacific Northwest. Riverside regularly dumps effluent into a nearby river. The Division of Environmental Conservation (DEC) claims that the effluent is toxic and jeopardizes the local salmon catch. Relations between the two parties have deteriorated. DEC has filed suit against Riverside in an attempt to close the plant. The trial date is three days away, and the parties are meeting to see if a last minute settlement is possible. Several issues will surface in the negotiation: Should Riverside be forced to purchase a special scrubber to neutralize the toxic effects of its effluent? Should Riverside be forced to close temporarily or permanently? Can DEC provide Riverside financial incentives to encourage cooperation?
OPTIONAL VIDEO:
- A discussion of the game, "DEC v. Riverside" — David Lax
- An analysis of players' scores from an actual run of the "DEC v. Riverside" role simulation, which is included in the video's teaching notes. (85 minutes)
MECHANICS:
The game can be played with one or two negotiators per side. No game manager is needed. Game instructions require at least 30 minutes to read. For thorough preparation, more time is suggested. Negotiations require at least 90 minutes; more time is preferable. Allow 60-90 minutes for review.
MAJOR LESSONS:
- Even though the two parties are likely to settle, the agreements they reach are typically far from optimal. Pareto-optimal scores can be displayed in this game. The players can then explore how and why superior agreements were not found. The concept of the pareto frontier can be developed.
- The concept of Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) is illustrated, since each side is given the information it needs to calculate the expected value of going to court. This can be compared to the value of possible negotiated agreements.
- Unless the parties cooperate (i.e., seek to respond to each other's most important interests), possible joint gains will be lost. The comparative advantages of cooperative versus competitive negotiation strategies can be illustrated. The tension between the urge to cooperate to claim value and the urge to compete to claim individual advantage is nicely illustrated. This allows for an extensive discussion of strategies for eliciting cooperation without making oneself vulnerable.
- The role of both shared and conflicting interests in creating joint gains is also illustrated. (Trading less important interests for more important interests is critical to achieving a pareto-optimal agreement).
TEACHING MATERIALS:
For all parties:
Role Specific:
Confidential Instructions for:
Teacher's Package (55 pages total):
PROCESS THEMES:
BATNA; Bluffing; Communication; Competition v. Cooperation; Confidentiality; Constituents; Cost-benefit analysis; Decision analysis; Fairness; Information exchange; Interest analysis; Interests, quantifying; Joint gains; Litigation analysis; Managing uncertainty; Media; Meeting design; Misrepresentation; Negotiator's Dilemma; Objective criteria; Offers, first; Options, generating; Pareto optimization; Power imbalance; Pressure tactics; Reservation price; Risk perception; Systems of negotiation; Threats; Time constraints
Deliberative Democracy Meets Dispute Resolution
The Workshop on Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution, sponsored by the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, was a two-day conference held on June 24 – 25, 2005 in Cambridge, Massachusetts. The event brought together 30 individuals who share a common interest in civic engagement, but represent two distinct fields that approach the project very differently. One group included public dispute resolution professionals; the other, political theorists and innovative practitioners of deliberative democracy. The differences between the fields were revealed as participants engaged in four panel discussions regarding hypothetical scenarios depicting difficult moments in democratic practice. Participants shared their opinion on how to approach the problems in the scenario, and discussion ensued.
This video attempts to capture the most interesting moments of dialogue from the workshop in order to illustrate the overlaps and divisions of opinion both between and within the respective fields.
DVD Scenes:
Introduction [14:17]
Scenario 1: Municipal Decision-Making
- Exchange 1: Supplementing representative democracy [9:07]
- Exchange 2: Consensus, common interest, stakeholders vs. the public [10:34]
- Exchange 3: The role of the media in deliberative processes [2:56]
- Exchange 4: Visioning [5:22]
- Exchange 5: Participant control over process design [1:46]
Scenario 2: Metropolitan Policy-Making
- Exchange 1: Process questions: role of the mediator, ideal processes, including underrepresented groups [22:09]
- Exchange 2: Rights and Rights-based politics [4:48]
- Exchange 3: Deliberation for the sake of learning rather than policymaking [5:07]
Scenario 3: National-level Consensus Building [3:11]
- Exchange 1: Who should be involved? [9:05]
- Exchange 2: Scientific or technical knowledge in deliberative processes [7:24]
- Exchange 3: EIA and minimum requirements for deliberative democracy [11:51]
- Exchange 4: Dispute Resolution biases [3:16]
Scenario 4: Implementation of Informally Negotiated Agreements [2:20]
- Exchange 1: Legitimacy in the process [9:38]
- Exchange 2: Dispute resolution processes should be long and recursive [9:22]
- Exchange 3: How can I apply deliberative democracy to dispute resolution [5:41]
Closing Comments [4:56]
Development on Bay Island
SCENARIO:
Manatee Townhomes, Inc., has proposed a residential development for a harbor island in Bay City. Before proceeding it must obtain the approval of Bay City's Department of Streets and Thoroughfares. Streets and Thoroughfares will grant approval only if Manatee agrees to pay a sum money in the form of a traffic impact exaction.
In this exercise the two groups meet to determine the amount of the exaction. Manatee wants a low exaction in order to keep its profits high; Streets and Thoroughfares wants a high exaction in order to minimize future tax levies. There is a large zone of potential agreement ($3.8 million to $10 million), but neither side knows too much about the interests of the other side. There are few, if any, opportunities for joint gains.
MECHANICS:
- Divide the group into teams of one or two Manatee representatives and one or two Street and Thorough-fares representatives. Distribute the confidential instructions, and allow 20-30 minutes for reading the instructions, preparing strategies, and, if there are two-person teams, caucusing with teammates. Allow 30-45 minutes to negotiate the exaction. Debriefing should last for 30-60 minutes.
- This case has a wide zone of potential agreement where each of the parties has reason to misunderstand the interests of the other side. In this sort of situation, the first offer is often powerful in anchoring the decision, but making a first offer that is advantageous to one's own side is difficult without securing information about the other side's true interests.
- This case explores the advantages and disadvantages of sharing information. Since this is a one-issue case with a wide zone of agreement, gaining information about the other side is to one's advantage and revealing information about one's own side is a disadvantage.
- This case presents the opportunity to distinguish between distributive bargaining and integrative bargaining situations, and to consider negotiation tactics that might be useful in each situations.
TEACHING MATERIALS:
Role Specific:
- Confidential Instructions for:
- Department of Street and Thoroughfares
Teaching Package:
PROCESS THEMES:
Anchoring; Bluffing; Information exchange; Interest analysis; Interests, quantifying; Misrepresentation; Offers, first
