When two rational players face off in a business negotiation, why do they settle for less than each of them could and should get? Each pursues his or her interests as theory dictates, but often the result is less than optimal. Young proposes that the root of the problem lies in the philosophical assumptions underlying decision and game theory. The common understanding of economic rationality is fundamentally flawed, he says. It assumes that rational players are always self-interested and make decisions on the basis of consequences.
Young maintains that a successful prescriptive theory of rationality must start from a different premise. He argues that negotiators must be autonomous agents who act over and above their inclinations. He advances his own notion of economic rationality, then seeks to establish rules by which rational economic players can jointly create a common base for business negotiation. The results of bargaining are then in equilibrium, and a solution optimal to both sides can be reached.
Rational Games: A Philosophy of Business Negotiation from Practical Reason Attributes
|Author:||Mark A. Young|
|Publisher:||Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2001|