What are concessions in negotiation? Concessions are the compromises or adjustments a negotiator makes to their original demands to move closer to agreement with their counterpart(s).

Key Insights

• The core concept: Effective concessions require strategic trade-offs and reciprocation rather than one-sided capitulation.
• The power of trade-offs: While single-issue ultimatums can trigger a destructive win-lose showdown, expanding a dispute to include multiple issues creates opportunities for mutual gain.
• The strategy: Make decreasing and contingent concessions, and de-escalate hardball tactics by reframing demands rather than retaliating.

Table of Contents

The Democrats’ Ultimatum

Is That All There Is?

Guidelines for Making Concessions in Negotiation

How Can You Make Smart Concessions?

Best Practices for Concessions in Negotiation

FAQs: Concessions in Negotiation

What should you do in a negotiation when the other party refuses to meet your key demand? It can be tempting to issue an ultimatum, but doing so is likely to box both parties into a corner.

That’s a lesson that Senate Democrats learned the hard way in the midst of the 2025 shutdown of the federal government. The decision of eight Democrats to concede on their chosen flagship issue in exchange for very little proved highly controversial—and violated best practices for making concessions in negotiation.

The Democrats’ Ultimatum

In September 2025, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives passed a funding bill for the 2026 fiscal year that excluded enhanced premium tax credits for Affordable Care Act (ACA) healthcare plans. In response, Senate Democrats issued a strict ultimatum: They said they would refuse to vote for any legislation that allowed the subsidies to expire. Both parties refused to compromise before the September 30 funding deadline, and the federal government shut down on October 1.

With the government negotiations largely at a standstill, the shutdown dragged on for more than a month and inflicted significant pain on ordinary Americans, as federal employees worked without pay, federal food aid (aka Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or SNAP, benefits) dried up, and travel was disrupted. Rather than negotiating with Democrats, President Donald Trump put pressure on them to back down from their ACA ultimatum by firing some federal workers and fighting in the courts to prevent SNAP benefits from being reinstated.

The takeaway: Issuing an ultimatum can seem like the only way to defend core principles. But if the other side responds with aggressive counterthreats, you can quickly become trapped between a harmful standoff and a humiliating retreat.

Is That All There Is?

Opinion polls showed the public blamed Republicans more than Democrats for the shutdown. The Democrats’ decisive showing in November 4 elections across the country also appeared to add to their negotiating power.

Yet, on November 9, the news broke that eight members of the Democratic caucus had agreed to fund a bill that did not include the ACA tax credits. In exchange for backing down, the senators secured only modest concessions from Republican negotiators, including the promise of a future vote on the tax credits, the rehiring of federal employees fired by Trump, and a short-term ban on future workforce reductions, Politico reports.

The eight senators (seven Democrats and one Independent) reportedly made the concession after concluding that congressional Republicans and President Trump were willing to allow the shutdown to continue indefinitely without conceding on ACA subsidies, even as the pain inflicted on everyday Americans mounted. “I think people were saying ‘We’re not going to get what we want’” on the health subsidies, Maine Senator Angus King, one of the eight, said. “But in the meantime, a lot of people are being hurt.”

The shutdown’s expected end came as welcome relief to millions of Americans. But many Democrats were furious that the eight senators had given in on their key demand and wondered what the painful shutdown—the longest in U.S. history—had achieved. “Yay, we can finally get paid,” one civil servant told the New Yorker. “But at the same time, W.T.F. was it all for? We were used as pawns in a political game, with nothing to show for it but stress, emotional trauma, and credit-card debt.”

The takeaway: Enduring a painful impasse is ultimately self-defeating if you cave on your primary demand for very little in return. Unreciprocated concessions not only result in a poor deal but also, in a multiparty or team negotiation, can damage your credibility with your own constituents.

Guidelines for Making Concessions in Negotiation

The following advice points can assist you in making concessions in negotiation that improve the quality of your deals—and avoid the need for capitulation or impasse.

Make trade-offs, not ultimatums. In the most efficient negotiations, parties make value-creating trade-offs by proposing concessions on the issues that matter most to each of them. For example, if you value short turnaround from a service provider, you might offer to pay more up front in exchange for a tighter-than-usual deadline. If the other side can work quickly and values early payment, they should be happy to make the trade. You each get more of what you want with minimal pain.

By comparison, when one party makes a demand on a single issue, they box both sides into a corner: Each now faces a stark choice between standing firm and backing down. Such take-it-or-leave-it ultimatums ratchet up the odds of competition, impasse, and capitulation. Indeed, in the three previous lengthy government shutdowns, as the New Yorker writes, “the party forcing the issue wilted under public pressure without getting what it came for, as the other side pointed to the intensifying costs for federal workers and average Americans.”

In the 2025 appropriations negotiations, political polarization, animosity, power differences, and deep distrust all made effective collaboration challenging. Yet having so many issues at stake, from ACA benefits to border security to security funding for federal officials, offered rich opportunities for both sides to get more of what they wanted. The fact that the two sides needed each other to make a deal—rather than being able to walk away and find a different partner, as is true of most business negotiations—offered further motivation for productive concessions in negotiation. Both sides squandered the opportunity.

Insist on reciprocation. The eight senators broke the most cardinal rule around making concessions in negotiation: Don’t make a concession without getting something of significance in return. When you make an unreciprocated concession, or fold completely, you signal weakness that could set you up to be taken advantage of in future negotiations.

Make decreasing concessions. When making concessions, start off with the largest concession you’re willing to make, then offer less and less in subsequent concessions. In their research, Kian Siong Tey and colleagues found that negotiators who offered concessions that decreased in size—rather than one large concession (as the eight senators did) or concessions that grew larger—got better deals.

Offer a contingent concession. What should you do when your counterpart seems completely self-interested? Harvard Business School Professor Deepak Malhotra recommends making a contingent concession. “A concession is contingent when you state that you can make it only if the other party agrees to make a specified concession in return,” he explains.

He gives the example of an executive who’s renegotiating a service contract with a customer who is demanding extra support for no extra fee. The executive might say, “We can provide additional support but only if you agree to purchase some of the following additional services” or “This is the best we can do on price, but if you can adjust some of your demands, we might be able to reopen the issue.” In the Senate negotiations, both Democrats and Republicans might have broken through their stalemate by replacing rigid demands with contingent concessions.

The takeaway: Never concede without receiving something in return. Try using contingent and decreasing concessions to signal your limits and encourage the other side to collaborate.

How Can You Make Smart Concessions?

• Avoid ultimatums. Expand the pie by looking for multiple issues to trade off, rather than drawing a hard line on a single demand.
• Defuse, don’t escalate. If the other party issues a threat or ultimatum, try ignoring it to give them the ability to back down without losing face.
• Take a break. Call a “time-out” to lower the emotional temperature. When talks resume, use active listening to diagnose the other party’s underlying needs.
• Insist on reciprocation. Never give something away for free. Always tie your concessions to a counter-concession from your counterpart.
• Pace yourself. Make concessions that decrease in size over time to signal that you are approaching your absolute limit.

Best Practices for Concessions in Negotiation

FAQs: Concessions in Negotiation

What are concessions in negotiation?

Concessions are adjustments, compromises, or sacrifices a negotiator makes to earlier proposals or offers. Negotiators make concessions to bridge the gap between parties’ demands and facilitate agreement.

How can I avoid looking weak when making a concession?

Always insist that the other party reciprocates your concessions and frame them as contingent on their flexibility. For instance, you might say, “I can adjust on price, but only if you can extend the contract timeline.”

Why are ultimatums risky in negotiation?

Ultimatums back all parties involved into a corner by requiring them to either completely capitulate or accept an impasse. This destroys opportunities for value creation and collaborative problem-solving.

What other strategies do you follow for making concessions in negotiation?

Have you ever heard of the door in the face technique? In a classic and rather amusing study from 1975, Arizona State University professor Robert Cialdini and his colleagues sent research assistants around campus posing as employees of the county’s juvenile detention center. They stopped people randomly on walkways and asked them if they would consider chaperoning a group of juvenile delinquents on a day trip to the zoo for no pay.

What do you think was the most common answer? That’s right: 83% of those asked passed on this unusual request.

Next, the research assistants approached different people with an even bolder request: Would they be interested in being considered to serve as an unpaid counselor at the juvenile detention center? They were told this volunteer position would require two hours of their time each week for a minimum of two years.

Not surprisingly, people didn’t exactly jump at this opportunity, either: In fact, everyone asked said no. But the researchers didn’t let them just walk away. They then asked them if they would instead be willing to consider chaperoning a group of juvenile delinquents on a day trip to the zoo for no pay.

Their responses were enlightening: A full 50% said yes, they would.

Why did people become so willing to agree to consider the significant request after turning down a much larger one? According to Cialdini and his team, when we back down from an extreme request and ask for less, the other party views this as a concession and feels compelled to reciprocate it. The norm of reciprocity compels us to try to repay in kind what someone else has “given” us, from a favor to an invitation to a concession in negotiation. Cultural anthropologists believe the drive to reciprocate was hardwired into our brains over the course of human history because it allowed us to share resources and skills in a “web of indebtedness.”

In the context of negotiation and persuasion, Cialdini refers to the strategy of following up an extreme request with a moderate one the “door in the face” (DITF) technique, playing on the image of a homeowner slamming the door in a salesperson’s face after she makes a ridiculous request. Research suggests that if a negotiator follows up the extreme request with a more moderate one, the proverbial door may stay open.

Will they get even, with the door in the face technique?

Given that door in the face technique has been studied only in one-off interactions, Professor Ricky S. Wong of Hang Seng Management College in Hong Kong and his colleagues wondered whether it could have a negative impact on a second negotiation with the same counterpart. If we sense that someone has used the door in the face technique to gain an advantage, we may try to “get even” by demanding more ourselves. After all, the norm of reciprocity works both ways—we respond in kind to negative as well as positive behaviors.

For their first experiment, the researchers divided 180 undergraduate students into the role of buyer or seller. The buyers were trained on how to use the DITF in a natural manner, and some of them were instructed to use the technique in the first of two negotiations with their counterpart. Specifically, they were told to ask their seller for the lowest price possible for a display screen and then, if their offer was rejected, to immediately make a more moderate request. Other buyers, those in the control group, were told not to use DITF but to negotiate as they saw fit.

When we back down from an extreme request and ask for less, the other party views this as a concession and feels compelled to reciprocate it.

After the first negotiation, some of the sellers were educated on various negotiation strategies, including DITF, and asked whether they thought their counterpart had used any of them. Next, the same pairs engaged in a second negotiation over the sale of a microchip, playing the same roles. After the second negotiation, those in the role of seller were told they’d be codeveloping a new product with someone and were given a choice between working with the same counterpart or being assigned to a new one.

In the experiment, sellers who detected that their counterpart used DITF in the first negotiation, as compared to those who did not, made more demanding opening offers in the second negotiation and reached better outcomes. They also viewed their counterpart as less trustworthy and were more likely to choose a new partner for the collaborative project. Overall, the study results seem to suggest that using the door in the face technique, and perhaps other persuasion techniques, could backfire if your counterpart senses that you have attempted to manipulate him or her. The findings suggest a note of caution to drawing simplistic conclusions from Cialdini’s 1975 study.

Have you ever used the door in the face technique? What were your results?

In a classic and rather amusing study from 1975, Arizona State University professor Robert Cialdini and his colleagues sent research assistants around campus posing as employees of the county’s juvenile detention center. They stopped people randomly on walkways and asked them if they would consider chaperoning a group of juvenile delinquents on a day trip to the zoo for no pay.

What do you think was the most common answer? That’s right: 83% of those asked passed on this unusual request.

Next, the research assistants approached different people with an even bolder request: Would they be interested in being considered to serve as an unpaid counselor at the juvenile detention center? They were told this volunteer position would require two hours of their time each week for a minimum of two years.

Not surprisingly, people didn’t exactly jump at this opportunity, either: In fact, everyone asked said no. But the researchers didn’t let them just walk away. They then asked them if they would instead be willing to consider chaperoning a group of juvenile delinquents on a day trip to the zoo for no pay.

Their responses were enlightening: A full 50% said yes, they would.

Why did people become so willing to agree to consider the significant request after turning down a much larger one? According to Cialdini and his team, when we back down from an extreme request and ask for less, the other party views this as a concession and feels compelled to reciprocate it. The norm of reciprocity compels us to try to repay in kind what someone else has “given” us, from a favor to an invitation to a concession in negotiation. Cultural anthropologists believe the drive to reciprocate was hardwired into our brains over the course of human history because it allowed us to share resources and skills in a “web of indebtedness.”

In the context of negotiation and persuasion, Cialdini refers to the strategy of following up an extreme request with a moderate one the “door in the face” (DITF) technique, playing on the image of a homeowner slamming the door in a salesperson’s face after she makes a ridiculous request. Research suggests that if a negotiator follows up the extreme request with a more moderate one, the proverbial door may stay open.

Will they get even?

Given that DITF has been studied only in one-off interactions, Professor Ricky S. Wong of Hang Seng Management College in Hong Kong and his colleagues wondered whether it could have a negative impact on a second negotiation with the same counterpart. If we sense that someone has used the DITF technique to gain an advantage, we may try to “get even” by demanding more ourselves. After all, the norm of reciprocity works both ways—we respond in kind to negative as well as positive behaviors.

For their first experiment, the researchers divided 180 undergraduate students into the role of buyer or seller. The buyers were trained on how to use the DITF in a natural manner, and some of them were instructed to use the technique in the first of two negotiations with their counterpart. Specifically, they were told to ask their seller for the lowest price possible for a display screen and then, if their offer was rejected, to immediately make a more moderate request. Other buyers, those in the control group, were told not to use DITF but to negotiate as they saw fit.

When we back down from an extreme request and ask for less, the other party views this as a concession and feels compelled to reciprocate it.

After the first negotiation, some of the sellers were educated on various negotiation strategies, including DITF, and asked whether they thought their counterpart had used any of them. Next, the same pairs engaged in a second negotiation over the sale of a microchip, playing the same roles. After the second negotiation, those in the role of seller were told they’d be codeveloping a new product with someone and were given a choice between working with the same counterpart or being assigned to a new one.

In the experiment, sellers who detected that their counterpart used DITF in the first negotiation, as compared to those who did not, made more demanding opening offers in the second negotiation and reached better outcomes. They also viewed their counterpart as less trustworthy and were more likely to choose a new partner for the collaborative project. Overall, the study results seem to suggest that using DITF, and perhaps other persuasion techniques, could backfire if your counterpart senses that you have attempted to manipulate him or her. The findings suggest a note of caution to drawing simplistic conclusions from Cialdini’s 1975 study.

We might hope that when we adopt negotiation best practices—such as spending lots of time preparing and asking questions at the table—we would achieve consistently strong results in our negotiations. Yet as most of us have experienced, our outcomes and personal satisfaction can vary a great deal from one negotiation to the next. Why?

First, individual differences—including differences in gender, culture, personality, intelligence, and experience—affect how we behave and what we achieve in negotiation. To take just a couple of examples, people who display anger in negotiation often claim more value than those who appear happy, while people from some Asian cultures may be more cooperative than people from some Western cultures.

How much do individual differences matter in negotiation? In a 2008 study, Professor Hillary Anger Elfenbein of Washington University in St. Louis and her colleagues attempted to answer this critical question. They set up round-robin negotiations involving four or five people whose individual differences had been assessed in a survey. Group members negotiated in pairs until each member had negotiated with every other member. This setup allowed the researchers to assess how consistently people behave across negotiations. The results suggest that our various traits do significantly affect our outcomes: In this study, about 28% of performance variations were linked to individual differences.

Mirror-image negotiations

Another factor that can affect how our negotiations unfold is the interpersonal dynamic that arises between us and our negotiating partner. Stated simply, we may behave differently with different negotiators due to the unique way in which our communication styles, personalities, skills, backgrounds, and so on, interact.

How much do interpersonal dynamics influence our negotiated outcomes? In a new study, Elfenbein and her colleagues wanted to answer this question by having pairs of participants negotiate round-robin style to see how consistently they would behave with each other over time. But they foresaw a problem with this method: Each time a pair negotiated with each other, that interaction would color their next negotiation, and so on. It would be impossible for pairs to start each negotiation with a blank slate.

To skirt this problem, Elfenbein and her team visited the Twins Day Festival in Twinsburg, Ohio, which has a research area where the twins who attend can take part in various studies. Although twins obviously are not clones of each other, past research has shown that they are similar enough in traits such as personality, intelligence, and family background that they can serve as reasonable stand-ins for each other.

The research team recruited 124 same-sex pairs of twins (83% identical, 13% fraternal, and 4% unsure) and collected data on four sets of twins at a time. Specifically, they divided four sets of twins and sent them to two different tents to engage in round-robin negotiations over the hypothetical sale of furniture pieces. The negotiations were mirror images of each other: When two people were negotiating with each other, their twins were negotiating with each other. This method allowed the researchers to approximate in two negotiations the dynamic between a pair of negotiators meeting for the first time.

As the researchers had hoped, twins negotiated very similarly to each other. They also tended to find the same twin pairs to be challenging. That is, if you found a person to be a tough negotiator, odds are that your twin had the same impression of that person’s twin. Overall, the researchers calculated that the unique interpersonal dynamic between a negotiating pair accounted for as much as 42% of the variance
in their results, significantly more than the 28% variance attributed to individual differences.

Striving for consistency

The results suggest that we negotiate quite a bit differently depending on whom we’re facing—and probably less consistently than we would like. More research is needed to better predict how well we will do, given our particular traits, when facing off with negotiators with the same or different traits. A pair of negotiators is as unique as a pair of snowflakes: No two pairs will negotiate in exactly the same way. But across pairs of individuals with certain traits are likely behavioral patterns that can be identified and used to better predict what will happen when we come together.

Resource: “On the Relative Importance of Individual-Level Characteristics and Dyadic Interaction Effects in Negotiations: Variance Partitioning Evidence from a Twins Study,” by Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Noah Eisenkraft, Jared R. Curhan, and Lisabeth F. DiLalla.Journal of Applied Psychology, 2018.

We might hope that when we adopt negotiation best practices—such as spending lots of time preparing and asking questions at the table—we would achieve consistently strong results in our negotiations. Yet as most of us have experienced, our outcomes and personal satisfaction can vary a great deal from one negotiation to the next. Why?

First, individual differences—including differences in gender, culture, personality, intelligence, and experience—affect how we behave and what we achieve in negotiation. To take just a couple of examples, people who display anger in negotiation often claim more value than those who appear happy, while people from some Asian cultures may be more cooperative than people from some Western cultures.

How much do individual differences matter in negotiation? In a 2008 study, Professor Hillary Anger Elfenbein of Washington University in St. Louis and her colleagues attempted to answer this critical question. They set up round-robin negotiations involving four or five people whose individual differences had been assessed in a survey. Group members negotiated in pairs until each member had negotiated with every other member. This setup allowed the researchers to assess how consistently people behave across negotiations. The results suggest that our various traits do significantly affect our outcomes: In this study, about 28% of performance variations were linked to individual differences.

Mirror-image negotiations

Another factor that can affect how our negotiations unfold is the interpersonal dynamic that arises between us and our negotiating partner. Stated simply, we may behave differently with different negotiators due to the unique way in which our communication styles, personalities, skills, backgrounds, and so on, interact.

How much do interpersonal dynamics influence our negotiated outcomes? In a new study, Elfenbein and her colleagues wanted to answer this question by having pairs of participants negotiate round-robin style to see how consistently they would behave with each other over time. But they foresaw a problem with this method: Each time a pair negotiated with each other, that interaction would color their next negotiation, and so on. It would be impossible for pairs to start each negotiation with a blank slate.

To skirt this problem, Elfenbein and her team visited the Twins Day Festival in Twinsburg, Ohio, which has a research area where the twins who attend can take part in various studies. Although twins obviously are not clones of each other, past research has shown that they are similar enough in traits such as personality, intelligence, and family background that they can serve as reasonable stand-ins for each other.

The research team recruited 124 same-sex pairs of twins (83% identical, 13% fraternal, and 4% unsure) and collected data on four sets of twins at a time. Specifically, they divided four sets of twins and sent them to two different tents to engage in round-robin negotiations over the hypothetical sale of furniture pieces. The negotiations were mirror images of each other: When two people were negotiating with each other, their twins were negotiating with each other. This method allowed the researchers to approximate in two negotiations the dynamic between a pair of negotiators meeting for the first time.

As the researchers had hoped, twins negotiated very similarly to each other. They also tended to find the same twin pairs to be challenging. That is, if you found a person to be a tough negotiator, odds are that your twin had the same impression of that person’s twin. Overall, the researchers calculated that the unique interpersonal dynamic between a negotiating pair accounted for as much as 42% of the variance
in their results, significantly more than the 28% variance attributed to individual differences.

Striving for consistency

The results suggest that we negotiate quite a bit differently depending on whom we’re facing—and probably less consistently than we would like. More research is needed to better predict how well we will do, given our particular traits, when facing off with negotiators with the same or different traits. A pair of negotiators is as unique as a pair of snowflakes: No two pairs will negotiate in exactly the same way. But across pairs of individuals with certain traits are likely behavioral patterns that can be identified and used to better predict what will happen when we come together.

Resource: “On the Relative Importance of Individual-Level Characteristics and Dyadic Interaction Effects in Negotiations: Variance Partitioning Evidence from a Twins Study,” by Hillary Anger Elfenbein, Noah Eisenkraft, Jared R. Curhan, and Lisabeth F. DiLalla.Journal of Applied Psychology, 2018.

In March, more than 700 Canadian doctors, residents, and medical students signed an online petition protesting their pay. The public health-care system in Quebec had been the victim of budget cuts, and the medical professionals weren’t happy.

But they weren’t complaining that their salaries were too low. On the contrary: They were angry that they had recently been granted pay raises. Federations representing 10,000 doctors in Quebec had negotiated to increase their salaries by about 1.4%, for an average annual salary of about $403,500. For some of the doctors, the raises were unconscionable, given that their nurses and clerks have been overworked as a result of budget cuts and staff shortages. Nurses had been trying to draw attention to their cause with sit-ins and social media posts.

“We believe that there is a way to redistribute the resources of the Quebec health system to promote the health of the population,” the doctors’ group wrote in their petition. They asked that their salary increases be canceled and the funds redistributed throughout the health-care system.

Quebec health minister Gaétan Barrette acknowledged the nursing crisis, saying that money was available to improve their working conditions. Of the protesting doctors, he said, according to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “If they feel they are overpaid, they can leave the money on the table. I guarantee you I can make good use of it.”

In negotiation, we often are encouraged to put our own needs, or those of the organization we represent, first. We learn to work with our counterpart to create as much value as possible for everyone at the table—and then to try to claim the bulk of that value for ourselves.

There’s nothing wrong with those goals, but they leave out two key considerations. First, in some negotiations, our agreement would harm or disadvantage outsiders. Take the case of a university that is negotiating to buy a private property and take it off the tax rolls, to the disadvantage of the local community. Harvard Business School professor Max H. Bazerman has argued that insiders have an ethical obligation to analyze how their deals would affect outsiders.

Second, we may have opportunities in negotiation to lift less powerful parties up along with ourselves—and we may not need to make a personal financial sacrifice to do so. As we’ll see, in recent years, negotiators in Hollywood, professional sports, and beyond have been coming up with creative ways to do just that. Their efforts could inspire business professionals across industries to try out similar strategies.

Easy riders?

“I have two words for you: inclusion rider,” Frances McDormand said, as she wrapped up her Academy Awards acceptance speech on March 4. With those two words, McDormand publicized a previously obscure method of negotiating for greater representation of women and minorities in film.

The notion of an inclusion rider, also known as an equity clause, was proposed by University of Southern California (USC) professor Stacy L. Smith in a 2014 Hollywood Reporter article and a 2016 TED Talk. In her research, Smith has found that for the past 50 years, white men have been given most of the speaking roles in Hollywood films; only about one-third of speaking roles are played by women, while racial minorities, LGBT people, and people with disabilities are far less represented. As a result, films often don’t accurately reflect the cultures they’re supposed to represent.

Smith estimates that about 75% of speaking roles are not pivotal to a film’s story and generally need not be filled by white males. A-list actors could promote greater diversity, she argues, by negotiating for a rider in their contract that would require the demographics of those hired for minor speaking roles to reflect the film’s setting. “It wouldn’t necessarily mean more lead roles for females,” Smith wrote in the Hollywood Reporter, “but it would create a diverse onscreen demography reflecting a population comprised of 50 percent women and girls.”

Washington, D.C.–based civil-rights attorney Kalpana Kotagal, who has worked with Smith to draft language for inclusion riders, told the Washington Post that such clauses have a good chance of succeeding in Hollywood because “everything is done on a project-by-project basis.” Actors, directors, production companies, and other entities could all negotiate for inclusion riders, which could also cover film crews. After McDormand’s speech, several prominent actors, including Brie Larson, committed to negotiating for the riders, as did Michael B. Jordan’s production company, Outlier Society. Leaders in other industries that lack diversity may also be able to negotiate inclusion riders for short-term and even long-term projects.

Borrowing from the NFL’s playbook

In 2002, after two African American head coaches were fired from the National Football League (NFL), a study was released showing that black coaches, despite their teams’ winning more games than teams led by white coaches, were less likely to be hired and more likely to be fired. Former NFL players Kellen Winslow and John Wooten spearheaded an effort aimed at ensuring that minority coaches would be seriously considered for top coaching positions in the league.

In 2003, the NFL instituted the Rooney Rule, which is named for former Pittsburgh Steelers owner Dan Rooney, who had chaired the NFL’s diversity committee. The rule currently stipulates that teams must interview at least one ethnic minority candidate for head coach and senior operations positions, but does not establish quotas or other preferential hiring policies. At first, the number of minority coaches hired increased significantly, but from 2012 to 2016, only one out of 21 open head- coach positions was filled by an ethnic minority. Today, five out of 32 NFL head coaches are black. Some think the rule needs to be adjusted to require teams to consider a higher percentage of diverse candidates.

Smith, the USC professor who popularized inclusion riders, has encouraged the entertainment industry to adopt the Rooney Rule; certain technology companies, including Pinterest and Facebook, have adopted similar rules.

Linking arms

Broad affirmative-action policies tend to be formulated within organizations or mandated by law rather than requested by individual negotiators in a job interview. But individuals can use other methods to negotiate on behalf of those who they believe are underrepresented or mistreated in an organization or field. Here again, Hollywood appears to be at the forefront.

During a panel at the 2018 Sundance Film Festival, actress Octavia Spencer recounted being approached by fellow actress Jessica Chastain about costarring with her in a comedy she was producing, Variety reports. Given recent revelations that women often are paid significantly less than men for leading roles, the two agreed they would push hard in their salary negotiations for the project.

Then Spencer told Chastain that women of color typically earn far less than white women in the entertainment industry do. Chastain “was quiet,” Spencer recalled, and then promised to link her negotiation to Spencer’s so that they would earn the same amount.

“Fast-forward to last week, we’re making five times what we asked for,” Spencer said, tearing up at Sundance as she told the story. Chastain later tweeted, “[Spencer] had been underpaid for so long. When I discovered that, I realized I could tie her deal to mine to bring up her quote. Men should start doing this with their female costars.”

In fact, actors such as Bradley Cooper have pledged to negotiate in tandem with their female costars. Such concerns about equity aren’t new. Actress Susan Sarandon told the BBC that when she was filming the 1998 film Twilight, she discovered that her costars, Gene Hackman and Paul Newman, were earning the same as each other but more than her, though the three had equal billing. When he heard about it, Newman shared some of his pay with her to help make up the difference. “He was a gem,” she said.

Advocating for equity

1. Consider outsiders. When negotiating a new deal, take time to think about and discuss with your counterpart how it may affect people who aren’t seated at the table.

2. Leverage your clout. Rather than hoarding your negotiating power, try sharing it with people who lack access by linking your negotiations. You may be able to help them gain some of the same advantages you’ve had.

3. Negotiate change from the inside. If a lack of equity or diversity in your organization concerns you, advocate for policies that would help level the playing field during hiring and promotion negotiations.