Joshua Greene

Joshua Greene

Professor, Department of Psychology, Harvard University

Director, the Greene Lab, Harvard University

Joshua Greene is an experimental psychologist, neuroscientist, and a philosopher who teaches in Harvard University’s Department of Psychology. He studies moral judgment and decision making, primarily using behavioral experiments and functional neuroimaging (fMRI). Greene’s research has been supported by the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and the MacArthur Foundation.

As the director of the Greene Lab, he has pioneered research on the respective contributions of “fast” automatic processes (such as emotional gut reactions) and “slow” controlled processes (such as reasoning and self-control). The author of the highly reviewed book Moral Tribes, Greene has appeared on Charlie Rose and Scientific American Frontiers, and his work has been featured in the New York Times, Discover Magazine, WNYC’s Radiolab, and NPR’s Morning Edition.

Education
Ph.D., Princeton University

A.B., Harvard University

Research interests

Psychological and neuroscientific study of morality; emotional and cognitive processes in moral decision making, religion, cooperation, conflict resolution

Selected publications

  • Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap between Us and Them. Penguin Books, 2014.
  • With J. M. Paxton. “Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral Decisions.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 106, no. 30 (2009): 12506–12511.
  • With N. Paharia, K. S. Kassam, and M. H. Bazerman. “Dirty Work, Clean Hands: The Moral Psychology of Indirect Agency.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 109 (2009): 134–141.
  • “Fruit Flies of the Moral Mind.” In What’s Next: Dispatches from the Future of Science, edited by M. Brockman. Vintage, 2009.
  • With F. A. Cushman, L. E. Steward, K. Lowenberg, L. E. Nystrom, and J. D. Cohen. “Pushing Moral Buttons: The Interaction between Personal Force and Intention in Moral Judgment.” Cognition 111, no. 3 (2009): 364–371.
  • “Dual-Process Morality and the Personal/Impersonal Distinction: A Reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45 (3) (2009): 581–584.

 

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