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"A Policy Towards Terrorism"
Our abhorrence of violence for international political purposes
should not cause us to react blindly. Qaddafi's emotional
and eccentric behavior should not lead us to respond in kind.
Whether Qaddafi did or did not stimulate a given bombing is
likely to be irrelevant to how we should best pursue our interests
in reducing international terrorism. We can differ about many
things, but let us start from some basic facts.
- No physical solution. There is no way in which
the United States can
provide physical security against terrorism. We spend millions
of dollars in trying to provide physical security for the
President and to reduce the risk to our airplanes. But there
is no way in which we can physically protect people and
property from violence. If terrorists cannot blow up airplanes,
there are many other potential targets. I do not want to
stimulate anti-social violence by listing all the ways in
which our society is vulnerable. A moment's thought will
suffice.
- Our goal: make terrorism bad politics. Since we
cannot physically prevent
terrorists from committing acts of violence, the only way
to reduce the risk is by trying to affect the decisions
of potential terrorists -- to influence them to do something
else. Deterrence is not likely to work. The risk of death
is already so high that threatening potential terrorists
with punishment is unlikely to cause them to change their
mind. The most promising way to reduce the incentive to
commit international violence is to make it as costly as
possible among their constituents for someone to kill innocent
civilians.
It is essentially a battle for legitimacy. We would like someone
who plants a bomb to look to his own constituents like a murderer,
not a martyr; like a criminal, not a crusader; like a butcher
of children, not a soldier in a cause. This suggests five
basic elements of a strategy:
- We should make clear to the world that peaceful means
of pursuing any grievance are always open. Rather than refusing
to negotiate with Qaddafi, we should insist that he negotiate.
We should not negotiate because he will persuade us, but
rather to bring the full force of our ideas and principles
to bear on him. If, as seems clear to me, our ideas are
better than his, let's take him on. And the more apparent
it is to the potential supporters of any terrorist that
peaceful means of seeking redress are open, the less legitimate
any violence against civilians will be.
- If the demands of those engaged in violence are illegitimate
(such as the release of convicted murderers), we should
look for legitimate grievances about which we might be able
to do something. And we should deal with such grievances
not because of the violence but because of their legitimacy,
and because doing so will reduce the likelihood of future
violence.
- We should treat terrorist acts as crimes, not as "war."
To call acts against civilians "war" is to treat
terrorists as soldiers in a cause. It is to provide legitimacy
to their conduct. They become one side of war, with us the
other. And if there is a war between "third-world freedom
fighters" and "capitalist United States,"
much of the world is not on our side.
- We should publicize the innocent victims, not the terrorists.
If the media wants to help reduce the risk of terrorism,
it should publish long and detailed accounts in human terms
of those women, children and others who have been killed,
maimed, or bereaved by acts of political violence. Just
as the photograph of the Vietnamese girl whose clothes had
been burned off caused many of us to question what we were
doing in Vietnam, so photographs and accounts of victims
of political violence will cause others to doubt the legitimacy
of what they are doing. We should not help murderers look
like heroes.
- We should avoid engaging in violence that will turn third
parties against the United States. The bombing of Libya
caused many European and non-aligned countries to criticize
the United States. We can certianly tolerate criticism if
our actions are well-designed and hold promise of being
effective. But where the effectiveness of our action depends
upon undercutting Libya's legitimacy, engaging in conduct
that puts many law-abiding countries "on Libya's side"
is worse than useless. It is counterproductive.
For the United States to convert the criminal bombing in
Berlin into a war betweeen U.S. military forces and the Goverment
of Libya seems to be the height of folly. Whatever Qaddafi's
role in encouraging that bombing may have been, the conduct
should be treated as criminal. We tend to legitimate the bombing
by treating it as comparable to ours. We send a loud message
that retaliation is a legitimate policy. If we kill innocent
Libyans in retaliation, why should they not kill innocent
Americans in further retaliation? Do we want to enter a contest
to see whether an American President is prepared to be more
brutal and wanton than Qaddafi?
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