Helping the Iranians Change Their Minds

The New York Times
November 10, 1979
By Roger Fisher

Cambridge, Mass. — However outrageous the seizure of American hostages by Iranian students, we should act analytically and purposively. Our purposes are, first, power – to preserve the reputation and prestige of the United States: second peace – to enhance respect for international law and order, largely by avoiding bad precedents; and, third, success – to win the release of the hostages.
In this case, in is beyond our power to produce the result we want by physical self-help. Whatever we do – even if we use military force – can have a constructive outcome only if it affects the thinking of someone else. If we want to change the Iranians' minds, we have to guess where their minds are today. In simple terms, the decision they face may be roughly as follows:

Today's choice: "Shall we Iranians release the hostages now? If we do:
1. We look incompetent.
2. We back down to Untied States imperialism.
3. We get nothing.

"On the other hand, if we do not, we gain the following advantages:
1. We look strong - we will be at the center of world attention.
2. We stand up to United States imperialism.
3. We may get the Shah or at least some of the money he took.
4. We can always release the hostages later if we have to.

Here in America, our job is to change that choice as Iranians see it. Consistent with our objectives, we want to make it as easy as possible for Iranians to decide as we would like them to decide. A target choice that we would like, and might reasonably expect Iranians to face might be this:

Tomorrow's choice: "Shall we Iranians now release the hostages? If we do:
1. We look responsible.
2. We accept the judgment of the international community.
3. We act consistently with Iran's traditions and with Islamic beliefs.
4. We have a chance in court to recover money the Shah took.
5. We might as well, since there is no chance of getting the Shah anyway.

"If, on the other hand we do not free the prisoners:
1. We look brutal.
2. We divide the Islamic world and antagonize most countries.
3. We act like the Shah, injuring innocent people.
4. We have a chance to get back some of the money the Shah took.
5. There is no chance of getting the Shah anyway.
6. The longer this goes on, the worse we look.

To change the Iranian's choice from the way it looked yesterday to the way we would like them to see it tomorrow, we must deal with what is important to them:

1. We should change the conflict from a contest of will (where they are strong) to one of principle (where we are strong).

2. We should change their perception of the conflict from one between Iran and the United States to one between some Iranians and the entire international community. Publicity should be given to those hostages who are not Untied States citizens. Other governments and organizations should be encouraged to take an active role. Maximum use should be made of the United Nations and Islamic institutions.

We should emphasize the innocent hostages. Wives, children, and other relatives should be encouraged to make public appeals. For example: "We thought the purpose of the Iranian revolution was to abolish political prisoners, coercion and the use of innocent human beings as pawns."

We should call attention to available legal remedies: "In every country there are courts to hear the claim that the Shah took public funds belonging to the Government of Iran. Pursuant to legal remedies, the Untied States returned to Venezuela both the former head of state and large funds."

We should lower their expectations by reference to treaties and law. The United States, under the Constitution, apparently lacks authority to seize the Shah and hand him over to Iran.

We should make prominent the Islamic and Persian traditions of respect for diplomatic immunity and disapproval of the taking of hostages.

There is no way in which the Untied States can guarantee the safety of the hostages. While steadfastly refusing to yield to coercion, we can remain open and flexible to lawful avenues through which Iran can pursue its interests, particularly its claim that the Shah took with him funds belonging to the people or Government of Iran. They may have a good case. At no cost to ourselves, we can emphasize their right to have that case heard.

We are learning that true power comes not from B-52's but from understanding the legitimate interests of others and then insisting upon adherence to principles that serve their interests as well as ours.