1st Draft of a Possible Agreement

Below, a first draft written by Roger Fisher on August 29, 1980 of the possible elements of a U.S. policy commitment in exchange for the release of the hostages.

Fisher's letter to Iranian officials preceding the draft indicates that he is making use of the one-text process - a drafting process famously used by President Carter at the Camp David Summit.


Fisher's First Draft of a U.S. Policy Commitment

By the kindness of the Algerian Embassy.

To his Excellency Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
President, Islamic Majlis
Tehran, Islamic Republic of Iran

Message from Professor Fisher, Professor of Law, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A

-----Urgent-----
Please deliver to Mr. Rafsanjani personally as soon as possible.
This messages is expected.
-----Urgent-----

  1. With reference to my telephone conversations with your office and with Dr. Beheshti, you will find below the text of the most recent version of my draft discussion paper outlining possible elements of an Iranian-US settlement.

  2. It is my belief that a decision by the Islamic Majlis on the hostage and related questions concerning the United States would be much easier if Iran knew just what the United States Government would do following the release of the hostages.

  3. Accordingly, as a Harvard professor and a private American citizen, I would like to complete as soon as possible a written recommendation as to the commitments that the United States Government should now make to Iran and to the United Nations on what U.S. policy toward Iran will be following the release of the hostages.

  4. Below is my preliminary working draft of such a U.S. policy commitment. This draft is not repeat not an official or unofficial U.S. government statement or proposal. It represents merely my own current thoughts on what such U.S. commitments should be, based on my current understanding of U.S. and Iranian interests. I expect to revise this draft repeatedly as my understanding of Iranina and other interests improves. Indeed, this draft differs even from the version I discussed with Dr. Beheshti yesterday. Since this text is only my personal draft I recommend it not be made public. Publication might generate misunderstanding.

  5. The draft is intended to reflect the following principles of legitimacy:
    A) that Iran seeks nothing more than that to which, in its view, it is legally or morally entitled; and
    B) that the United States, in turn, in response to Iranian requests, should provide Iran with no more and no less than that to which Iran would have been legally or morally entitled if the hostages had not been taken.

    I believe that a settlement based on these principles would be just, and politically feasible. Neither side would be or would appear to be giving in to coercion, and both would be gaining satisfaction of their legitimate interests.

  6. My purpose in sharing this draft with you and others is to gain from your criticism a better understanding of the basic interests of Iran, thereby enabling me to produce a better draft.

*** Following is the current version as of August 29, 1980 of a possible U.S. commitment as drafted by me, Roger Fisher. This draft has not been approved by any official in either government. ***

Dear _____________________:

Let me confirm that immediately following the release of the hostages, the official policy of the United States Government shall be as follows:

  1. Acceptance of the Revolution. The United States fully accepts the legitimacy of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as the result of a popular revolution.
  2. Non-Interference. The United States will not interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. The United States will take no action to overthrow or to support the efforts of others to overthrow the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
  3. No Punitive Action. The United States will take no punitive action against Iran, whether military, economic, diplomatic, political, or of any other kind.
  4. End of Sanctions. The United States will promptly terminate all sanctions against Iran and against Iranian nationals. In particular:
    • There shall be no special restrictions or adverse treatment applicable to Iranian students in the United States.
    • There shall be no U.S. governmental restrictions on sales to or purchases from Iran or Iranian nationals other than those applicable to other governments and other nationals.
    • Following the financial settlement there shall be no special U.S. governmental restrictions on financial transactions with Iran or with Iranian nationals.
  5. Stolen Wealth. The United States Government will actively cooperate with the Government of Iran in seeking to locate all funds properly belonging to the Government of Iran that were wrongfully removed from Iran by the Shah, and will facilitate and support the use by the Government of Iran of judicial and other legal remedies to recover such funds.
  6. Inter-Governmental Claims. The United States assumes special responsibility for pursuing the issue of financial compensation for and with respect to the hostages. Those claims, claims with respect the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Consulates in Iran, claims by Iran against the Government of the United States and all other inter-governmental claims shall be negotiated between the two governments. In these negotiations, the United States will accept the assistance of a mutually acceptable third party should Iran so desire.
  7. Bank Loans; Commercial and Other Private Claims; Litigation. The United States will actively promote a prompt and just settlement of private financial and commercial claims with Iran, first through negotiation and, to the extent necessary, through an international claims commission or other such procedure. The United States understands that Iran wishes to pay its just debts. The United States, in turn, is prepared on a basis of reciprocity with Iran to support a settlement based on two principles:
    • First, that with respect to its funds, Iran should be treated equally with other sovereign states; and
    • Second, that a settlement should seek to restore the parties, as near as may be, to the legal and equitable position they would have been in had the hostages not been taken.
  8. Other Countries. The United States Government will encourage U.S. allies in Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and other countries to stop their economic and political restrictions against Iran and to continue full cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

 

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