The
following tables, known as "Currently Perceived
Choice" charts, were developed at HNP to help
identify constraints preventing each side from acceding
to the other's demands. The charts were then used
to devise offers that the other side would be more
likely to accept.
The
first chart depicts how the choice of a typical Iranian
student leader must have looked throughout most of
the conflict.
The
second depicts how President Carter might have viewed
the costs and benefits of making additional offers
to the Iranians.
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Currently
Perceived Choice of an Iranian Student Leader
"Shall I press for immediate release
of the American hostages?"
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If I say "yes"....
- I sell out the Revolution
- I will be criticized as pro-American
- The others will probably not agree with me...
- If they do and we release the hostages, then:
- Iran looks weak.
- We back down to the U.S.
- We get nothing (no Shah, no money.)
- We do not know what the U.S. will do
BUT:
+ There is a chance that economic sanctions might
end.
+ Our relations with other nations, especially in
Europe, may improve
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If I say "no"....
+ I uphold the Revolution
+ I will be praised for defending Islam
+ We will probably all stick together
+ We get fantastic TV coverage to tell the world about
our grievances
+ Iran looks strong
+ We stand up to the U.S.
+ We have a chance of getting something (at least our
money back)
+ The hostages provide some protection against U.S.
intervention
+ The U.S. may make further commitments about our money,
non-intervention, ending sanctions, etc.
BUT:
- Economic sanctions will no doubt continue
- Our relationship with other nations, especially in
Europe will suffer
- Inflation and economic problems will continue
- There is a risk that the U.S. might take military
action (but a martyr's death is the most glorious)
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If
a typical student leader's choice looked even approximately
like this, it is understandable why the militant students
held the hostages for so long. As outrageous and illegal as
the original seizure may have been, once the hostages had
been seized it was not irrational for the students to keep
holding them from one day to the next, waiting for a more
promising time to release them.
Currently
Perceived Choice of President Carter
"Shall I now promise to return the
money that the Shah took from Iran?"
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If I say "yes".....
+ Iran will be pleased (at first)
BUT:
- I cannot deliver, because such money is no doubt
hidden in Swiss bank accounts
- The U.S. will look like it is giving in; it will be
humiliated
- I will be criticized by Reagan and may lose the election
because I look 'soft'
- The Iranians will certainly ask for more before releasing
the hostages
- I will get nothing
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If I say "no"....
- There is no progress toward release of the hostages
BUT:
+ I look tough
+ I keep my options open
+ I yield nothing
+ I can always make this promise later if it looks like
a good idea
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President
Carter faced the unappetizing choice of making an offer knowing
that doing so would almost certainly result in additional
demands, and that the more he offered the more was likely
to be demanded. Thus for most of the conflict, both parties
pursued 'rational' courses of action that resulted in intractable
deadlock.
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